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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
CONSENT TO OPERATIVE PROCEDURES
By KENNETH C. PROCTOR*
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this article is to present the various
problems involved in consent to operative procedures, and
the applicable rules of law which have been announced by
the courts.
The principles applicable to many legal questions differ
from state to state - in some cases only in degree, in
others in substance. However, the basic rules applicable to
this problem, as announced by the courts throughout the
country, are, generally speaking, uniform and fairly easy
to state. It is the application of those principles to a given
set of facts that is troublesome. This is particularly true
because it is the physician who must, in the first instance
and under varying circumstances, apply those rules by
the exercise of his judgment.
It is rarely the routine case which creates a problem
but rather the unusual or the emergency. Then the physi-
cian's judgment is subjected to its severest test - many
times without an opportunity to consult with anyone.
Assume, a surgeon is visiting his patients in a hospital
late in the afternoon when he is summoned to the Emer-
gency Room by the Resident in Surgery. A ten year old
boy, who obviously has been involved in a bad accident,
is lying there. The surgeon's examination indicates that
a blood transfusion is urgently required. His parents ar-
rive as the examination is completed. Upon being advised
of the surgeon's conclusion, the father consents. How-
ever, the mother states that she is a member of a religious
sect which forbids operations of any kind and cannot con-
sent to the transfusion. This is not a melodramatic figment
of imagination. It is a case which occurred recently in
Baltimore City (Levitsky v. Levitsky1) where, upon the
father's petition, Judge Shirley Jones signed an order di-
recting the transfusion. It might be added, this is not a
rare case.
The phases of this subject which I propose to discuss
are (1) how consent may be obtained; (2) the limitations
on the authority of the physician under such consent; and
(3) who may consent.
* President of the Maryland Bar Association; A.B. 1928, Johns Hopkins
University; LL.B. 1932, University of Maryland.1 Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 101 A-953, A-42293, December 22,
1961.
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How CONSENT MAY BE OBTAINED
1. Mandate of public authority
First, the authority for the operation may be provided
by statute or by order of court. For example, the statutes
which make it the duty of the parent or guardian to have
his children vaccinated.2 Such a requirement was held
valid by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.3
Massachusetts had enacted a statute authorizing local
Boards of Health to adopt compulsory vaccination regula-
tions and to enforce them. Cambridge adopted such a regu-
lation. Jacobson refused to permit the physician, acting for
the board, to vaccinate him. Criminal charges were brought
against him. He was tried and convicted. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. On appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States Jacobson claimed
unconstitutional invasion of his liberty guaranteed by the
14th Amendment - that compulsory vaccination consti-
tuted an assault. In a 7-2 decision the Supreme Court held
the statute to be valid, saying:
"The authority of the State to enact this statute is to
be referred to what is commonly called the police
power * * * According to settled principles the police
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least,
such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health
and the public safety."4
Another example is a compulsory sterilization statute
where a patient in a state institution is afflicted with an
hereditary form of insanity or imbecility. A Virginia
statute making such provision was held valid by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the case of Buck v.
Bell.'
Defendant was an imbecile - daughter of an imbecile,
and mother of an imbecile.
Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
' In Maryland, 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, § 73.
'197 U.S. 11 (1905).
'Id., 24-25.
p274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vac-
cination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough."6
The Levitsky7 case, referred to above, is an example of
consent effected by an order of court.
2. Express consent
The cases just discussed are, however, the exception.
Generally the surgeon is faced with an operation, volun-
tary on the part of the patient.
It is elementary that whenever an operative procedure
- no matter how simple - is proposed, consent of the
patient or someone authorized to act on his behalf must
be obtained. A condition precedent, in most cases, is an
explanation by the physician, comprehensible to the pa-
tient, of the nature of the operation, why it is required,
and the hazards, if any, involved. In addition to this, the
person purporting to consent must be of age and must be
competent.
A very recent decision of the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, State v. Fishel,8 was concerned with the converse of
the phase of the problem just suggested. The extent of
the duty of the surgeon to impress the necessity for an
operation upon a patient was involved. The Court held
that the physician had fully carried out that duty to the
patient; that he had sufficiently advised him of the risks
involved if he did not have an operation. There the doctor
had even reserved a bed for the patient who, for a few
crucial days, had refused to go. The case points out, how-
ever, that there is a duty and responsibility on the part
of the physician to impress upon the patient the need for
an operation and the reasons therefor, provided, of course,
that it is a real necessity.
The safest course is to obtain the consent of the patient
in writing. This should be done not in haste, at the last
moment and possibly after the patient has been subjected
to sedation. The writing should be broad enough to cover
not only the contemplated operation but also other proce-
dures, in the event that any unforseen condition arises
in the course of the operation which, in the judgment of
the surgeon, are required to preserve the life or limb or
I d., 207.
Supra, n. 1.8228 Md. 189, 179 A. 2d 349 (1962).
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health of the patient. It should also authorize the ad-
ministration of appropriate anesthesia. It should be wit-
nessed and there should be noted thereon a contem-
poraneous summary of the circumstances under which the
consent was obtained, including the condition of the pa-
tient.
The suggestions which have just been made constitute
an attempt to avoid the problems which arose in the case
of Stone v. Goodman.' There the plaintiff had signed a
written consent to the operation containing no limitation.
He admitted his signature but contended that the consent
had been signed by him immediately before the operation
and while he was under sedation. Evidence offered by
defendants indicated that it had been signed upon plain-
tiff's admission to the hospital.
Plaintiff had been injured by a fall in the course of his
employment. Examination indicated an umbilical hernia
and contusions of the lower right groin. Plaintiff was
referred to Dr. Goodman, who was an experienced and
reputable surgeon who had performed more than 1,000
hernia operations. His examination indicated a small, in-
complete, indirect, oblique, inguinal hernia on the right
side; direct hernia on the left side (which) permitted the
introduction of the fingers directly into the peritoneal
cavity - also the umbilical hernia.
Plaintiff contended that he had no pain in, and had not
consented to an operation on, the left side. The hernia on
the left was borne out by the operation; the hernia on the
right, in the opinion of Dr. Goodman, did not require
operative procedure.
In discussing the problems presented by this case, the
court said:
"The rule requiring a physician and surgeon to use
his best judgment does not make him liable for a mere
error of judgment, provided he does what he thinks is
the best after careful examination. A physician and
surgeon's implied engagement with his patient does
not guarantee a good result, but he promises by im-
plication to use the skill and learning of the average
physician, to exercise reasonable care, and to exert
his best judgment in the effort to bring about a good
result."10
'241 App. Div. 290, 271 N.Y.S. 500 (1934).
- Id., 507.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
If there is no opportunity to obtain a written authoriza-
tion, an oral consent is just as valid. Obviously it is more
difficult to prove, should it be questioned at a latter date.
Care should be taken, therefore, to have such a consent
witnessed by someone, for example an intern or nurse.
As soon as is practicable thereafter the physician and
witness should note on the hospital records the authority
to operate and the circumstances under which it was
given. If the procedure is performed some place other
than a hospital, the pertinent information should be en-
tered on the patient's history card.
The perils involved in an oral consent are illustrated by
the case of Woodson v. Huey." There a chronic appendix
had been diagnosed and an operation advised. The patient
consented but stated that she wished a general anesthetic
- not a spinal. This information was noted on her chart
by her surgeon. Although the anesthetist had read the
chart, he claimed that he had persuaded the patient, while
on the operating table, to submit to a spinal anesthesia.
This claim was denied by plaintiff. She was given a spinal
anesthetic and partial paralysis resulted.
The jury believed the patient and returned a verdict
in her favor as against both the surgeon and the anesthetist.
On appeal this was affirmed as to the latter and reversed as
to the former, the Court holding that the surgeon had done
everything required of him.
When consent has been obtained the universal rule is
that the surgeon may perform only the operation to which
the parties have agreed except in cases of emergency, when
good surgery demands some other procedure to preserve
the life, limb or health of the patient and a supplemental
authorization cannot be obtained. The physician cannot
extend the operation merely because he is of the opinion
that it is desirable or would benefit the patient.
This rule is well stated in the case of Nolan v.
Kechijian,12 where the surgeon was held to have exceeded
his authority. Plaintiff complained of pains in the region
of her stomach on the left side under the ribs. After
examination, including x-rays, defendant advised an opera-
tion "to build up the ligaments" which supported the
spleen. During the operation the spleen was removed, de-
fendant claiming that a large hemorrhage had developed
making removal necessary. Pathological examination
showed a "few fibrous adhesions" on the inner surface of
the spleen but that nothing else was wrong.
-261 P. 2d 199 (Okl. 1953).
275 R.I. 165, 64 A. 2d 868 (1949).
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The Court stated:
"In consenting to an operation... an adult patient of
sound mind is entitled to rely on the representations
of a surgeon and ... to limit his consent to an opera-
tion reasonably appropriate to relieve him of his con-
dition. Although a surgeon must necessarily be al-
lowed reasonable latitude in performing the operation
within the scope of the patient's consent, we know of
no rule or principle of law which extends to him free
license to operate at will. In the absence of excep-
tional circumstances, an operation without consent
or in excess of consent, express or reasonably im-
plied, constitutes a technical assault and battery for
which he is liable .... 11
That the same principles apply to a case where the
authorization is oral is supported by the case of McClees
v. Cohen.14 Defendant was a dentist who had extracted
two good teeth instead of two baby roots as requested.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff and said:
"This is not a case wherein a emergency arose calling
for immediate action in order to preserve the life or
health of the patient and it was impracticable to ob-
tain her consent, or one wherein, in the course of an
operation, conditions not anticipated were discovered
which, if not removed, would endanger the life or
health of the patient.' 5
3. Implied consent
Authority to operate may also be implied from the
surrounding facts and circumstances or from the actions
of the patient. A man comes to a physician's office and
complains of an infected finger. After examination, he is
told that the infected area should be lanced. The patient
sticks out his finger and the law raises an implication that
he has authorized the procedure. In McClees v. Cohen
the Court of Appeals said, (referring to removal of plain-
tiff's teeth by defendant) that if "the matter of their re-
moval had been submitted to the exercise of [the dentist's]
judgment, there could have been no recovery in this case.'"16
'aId., 867-868.
1' 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930).
Ibid.
158 Md. 60, 65, 148 A. 124 (1930).
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A physician enters an accident room. A victim of an
automobile accident is there. His chest is crushed and he
is unconscious and in shock. There is no means of identi-
fying him. Authority to perform such operative procedure
as, in the physician's opinion, is required to preserve the
man's life, limb or health is implied.
The rule just stated is equally applicable where express
authority to operate has been given and in the course of
the procedure the surgeon encounters an unforseen con-
dition, or is confronted with an emergency, immediate
correction of which is imperative to preserve the patient's
life, limb or health. The law implies consent to proceed.
Implied consent is the phase of the problem which
presents a physician with his moments of truth. It is on
such occasions that he must exercise his best judgment and
pray he is right. Will a deviation from what was agreed to
or anticipated preserve the life, limb or health of the
patient, or is it a procedure which might merely improve
his condition? Consideration of a few cases which involved
implied consent may be of some help.
A leading case on the question is Mohr v. Williams.7
There the patient complained of difficulty with her right
ear. In addition to examining that ear the physician at-
tempted to examine the left, but could not do so because of
an obstruction. An operation on the right ear was advised
and the patient consented. After anesthesia had been ad-
ministered both ears were examined carefully and it was
determined that conservative treatment would take care
of the difficulty in the right ear, but that an operation
should be performed upon the left ear where there was a
"small perforation . . . high up in the drum membrane,
hooded, and with granulated edges, and the bone of the
inner wall of the middle ear was diseased and dead."' 8
This was called to the attention of the patient's family
physician, who agreed that an operation on the left ear
should be performed.
The Court held: First that there was no emergency and
that the operation, therefore, constituted a technical as-
sault and battery, and, second, that the consent of the
family physician did not constitute the consent of the
patient. In so holding, the Court said:
"If a person should be injured to the extent of render-
ing him unconscious, and his injuries were of such a
1,95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), cited with approval by the Mary-
land Oourt of Appeals.
Id., 13.
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nature as to require prompt surgical attention, a physi-
cian called to attend him would be justified in ap-
plying such medical or surgical treatment as might
reasonably be necessary for the preservation of his
life or limb, and consent on the part of the injured
person would be implied. And again, if, in the course
of an operation to which the patient consented the
physician should discover conditions not anticipated
before the operation was commenced, and which if
not removed, would endanger the life or health of
the patient, he would though no express consent was
obtained or given, be justified in extending the opera-
tion to remove and overcome them."19
In Wheeler v. Barker,20 examination of plaintiff indicated
either an ovarian cyst or growth on the uterus. She had suf-
fered for some time from continued vaginal bleeding. The
patient signed a consent to an operation. However, there
was a dispute as to when and under what circumstances it
had been executed. Plaintiff contended that it had been
signed just before the operation. Defendant's testimony in-
dicated that it had been obtained by a nurse and before the
administration of sedation.
The operation revealed that the ovaries were not dis-
eased but that there was a large tumor attached to the
uterus adjacent to the right ovary, and that the uterine
wall was filled with multiple fibroid tumors. There was
no malignancy, but the surgeon was afraid malignancy
might develop. After consultation the surgeons agreed that
a subtotal hysterectomy was necessary.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant,
which was affirmed on appeal, the Court saying:
"When a surgeon is confronted with an emergency or
an unanticipated condition and immediate action is
necessary for the preservation of the life or health
of the patient and it is impracticable to obtain consent
to an operation which he deems to be immediately
necessary, it is his duty to do what the occasion de-
mands within the usual and customary practice among
physicians and surgeons in the same or similar lo-
calities, and he is justified in extending the operation
and in removing and overcoming the condition with-
out the express consent of the patient."21
Id., 15.
20 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P. 2d 68 (1949).
Id., 71.
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Reddington v. Clayman22 is a case where it was held
that the authorization from the patient was exceeded by
the surgeon and that he was not justified in going beyond
the consent. The infant plaintiff was operated on for T.
and A. In the course of the procedure the uvula was re-
moved. Defendant contended that he had discussed this
with the parents and that they had agreed; that the
reason for removal of the uvula was that plaintiff's brother
had died of cancer of the throat which apparently had
initiated in the uvula; that in fact it served no function.
This contention was denied by the parents. The Massa-
chusetts Court stated:
"It could not be ruled that consent to the removal of
the uvula in the circumsttances was necessarily im-
plicit in the authority given. There was no medical
testimony that it was usual to do this. There was no
suggestion that the defendant found anything when
operating which made it reasonable then forthwith to
remove the uvula as a part of what was being done.
On the contrary the defendant stood expressly on
what he saw and learned prior to the operation."2
In Delahunt v. Finton,4 during the course of an ex-
amination under anesthesia, to which plaintiff had con-
sented, defendant passed a filiform bougie through the
urethral passage into the bladder, followed by a metal
sound to dilate the urethral strictures of which plaintiff
complained. The bougie looped in the bladder and could
not be removed. After consultation with his associates
defendant operated so that the bougie could be removed.
It was the contention of plaintiff that this was done with-
out her consent. The surgeon claimed an unforseen con-
tingency which resulted in an emergency endangering life
and health of plaintiff. The Court stated the rule applica-
ble in such a case as follows:
"It is settled that a surgeon may lawfully perform and
it is his duty to perform, such operation as good sur-
gery demands, in cases of emergency, without the
consent of the patient. In so doing he is not liable for
an honest error in judgment. * * * Defendant's negli-
gence cannot be presumed, but must be affirmatively
proved. '25
324 Mass. 244, 134 N.E. 2d 920 (1956).
8 Id., 922.
244 Mich. 226, 221 N.W. 168 (1928).
Id., 169.
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On the other hand, in Franklyn v. Peabody,26 the Michi-
gan Court held that the following facts did not constitute
implied consent under the emergency rule. Plaintiff com-
plained of a stiff finger, and consented to an operation
thereon. The finger and the palm of the hand were opened
and it was found that the superficial and deep tendons had
adhered together. The surgeon considered that it was
necessary to sheath them in added fascia so as to separate
them. He made an incision in the right thigh and obtained
fascia lata therefrom. Plaintiff sustained a disability of
the leg as a result of this phase of the operation.
In Bennan v. Parsonnet, 27 a previous operation to cor-
rect a hernia on patient's left side had been unsuccessful.
He submitted to an operation to correct that condition.
After the administration of anesthesia and further ex-
amination it was discovered that he had a hernia on the
right which was much more serious, defendant being of the
opinion that it might strangulate. It was determined that
this was not true of the hernia on the left. The surgeon
operated on the hernia on the right. Although the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, this was reversed on
appeal, the court considering that this constituted an
emergency which supported an implied consent.
In Valdez v. Percy," examination revealed a lump the
size of a small egg in right axilla. The malignancy board
of the hospital ordered an exploratory operation. The
lump was removed and sent to the laboratory. First report
(5 or 10 minutes later) was "carcinoma of the breast. '29
The operation had been barely resumed (skin incised)
when the second report was received informing the sur-
geons that there had been a mistake in the first diagnos-
tic report, and that the true diagnosis was "lymphoma,
possibly Hodgkin's disease"30 - The operation proceeded
and the breast was removed.
The patient had signed a blanket consent. The Court
held:
"It is firmly established as the law that where a
person has been subjected to an operation without his
consent such a operation constitutes technical assault
and battery."31
2249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930).
' 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
2835 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P. 2d 142 (1939).
- Id., 144.
0Ibid.
-Id., 145.
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Referring to the signed consent the Court said:
"[W]e do not understand such agreement to consti-
tute a consent to perform operations other than the
one for which the operating surgeons were engaged
by plaintiff to perform unless necessity therefor arose
during the authorized operation .... And in any event,
such an agreement does not absolve the operating
physicians of liability for negligence, if any existed, in
the performance of such operation."32
4. Ineffective consent
Even if a physician has obtained the patient's authoriza-
tion to operate, under some circumstances such consent
may be ineffective. If the physician is guilty of either fraud
or misrepresentation toward the patient prior to the opera-
tion, and the patient's consent is obtained as a result of
such fraud or misrepresentation, it is invalid. Misrepre-
sentation can, of course, consist either of some positive
act by the surgeon or the failure to make a sufficient dis-
closure to the patient.
In Wall v. Brim,33 the patient had developed what ap-
peared to be a small cyst on the neck just under the back of
her ear. Defendant advised her that its removal would be
simple and would not require over ten minutes. The opera-
tion was performed under a local anesthetic. After the
operation was commenced it was discovered that the cyst
extended down between the muscles and was deeper than
the surgeon had believed. After this discovery, defendant
did not advise plaintiff of the problem presented and what
might result. He did not obtain her consent to the much
more extensive operation.
Judge Hutchinson stated the general rule on this point
as follows:
"The obligation underlying this rule is not satisfied by
a consent obtained under a mistaken diagnosis that
the operation is simple and without danger, when a
later diagnosis, while the patient is still conscious and
no emergency exists, discloses that the operation is
both difficult and dangerous. The rule extends no
further than to hold that if a physician advises his
patient to submit to a particular operation and the
patient weighs the dangers and results incident to its
performance and finally consents, he thereby in ef-
Ibid.
138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
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fect enters into a contract authorizing his physician to
operate to the extent of the consent given but no
further."3 4
Whether a minor can or cannot authorize an operation
depends upon his maturity and comprehension of what is
proposed. If he has matured sufficiently to understand the
nature of the procedure and the possible consequences,
then, if his parent or guardian is not available, he may
legally consent even though under twenty-one. If he does
not have sufficient comprehension, then he may not.
The same general rule is applicable to persons of ques-
tioned mental capacity and inebriates, their consent will
be effective if, and only if, they comprehend the proposed
procedure and the risks, if any, involved.
PERSONS GIVING CONSENT
1. Married persons
Ordinarily it is sufficient if the surgeon obtains the con-
sent of the person upon whom the operation is to be per-
formed. In State, use of Janney v. Housekeeper and
Gifford,8 5 pre-operative examination indicated a lump in
the breast of the wife. It was believed to be a tumor but
later it was determined to be cancer. Some time after the
operation the wife died and the husband sued the surgeon,
claiming that he had consented to the removal of a tumor
but that he did not consent to the excision of a cancer. In
holding that his consent was not required, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland said:
"Surely the law does not authorize the husband to say
to his wife, you shall die of the cancer, you cannot be
cured, and a surgical operation affording only tem-
porary relief, will result in useless expense. The hus-
band had no power to withhold from his wife the
medical assistance which her case might require. * * *
The consent of the wife, not that of the husband was
necessary. * * * They [the physicians] could not, of
course, compel her to submit to an operation, but if
she voluntarily submitted to its performance, her con-
sent will be presumed, unless she was the victim of a
false and fraudulent misrepresentation, which is a
material fact to be established by proof. * * * If the
Id., 481.
70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
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plaintiff alleges that there was no consent, he must
establish his affirmation by proof. The party who al-
lows a surgical operation to be performed is presumed
to have employed the surgeon for that particular pur-
pose." 6
2. Minors
In the case of any operation upon a minor it is certainly
desirable that the surgeon obtain, if possible, the consent
of one or both parents. Although there is no case in Mary-
land that holds that where an operation on an infant is
necessary consent will be implied, there is a decision to
the effect that parents who refuse, without justification, to
consent to an operation on their child may be subjected to
punishment in the criminal court.
In Craig v. State,37 a six-month old child had been ill
for eighteen days prior to his death, during which period
the parents had furnished no medical care because of
their religious training. During the initial stages of the
illness the child did not seem to be very ill, it being only
during the two days prior to death that the child became
obviously seriously ill. The parents were charged with
involuntary manslaughter and, on trial, were convicted.
On appeal the case was reversed, and remanded for a new
trial. However, the Court referred to Article 72A, section
1,38 which inter alia, charges parents, jointly and severally,
with support, care, nurture, welfare and education of their
minor children, and held that although medical care was
not referred to in specific terms, it was embraced within
the scope of the statute. The Court further held that
failure to perform a specific legal duty which results in
death, subjects such person to a charge of involuntary
manslaughter. Finally, the Court held that the parents
"were, and are, at perfect liberty to believe in the
religion of their selection; they may pray, anoint and
call in the Elders of their Church in case of sickness of
their minor children; but they, like all parents, must
also obey the mandate of Article 72A, Section 1, by pro-
viding medical aid when the circumstances properly
call for the same. '39
aId., 169-171.
t 220 Md. 590, 155 A. 684 (1959).
U 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 72A, § 1.
220 Md. 590, 600-601, 155 A. 684 (1959).
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(c) Incompetents
If a person is mentally incompetent then his or her con-
sent to operative procedure may be given by the husband
or wife or parent or guardian. That a physician cannot
be too careful in ascertaining that the patient is mentally
incompetent before acting under such consent is illus-
trated by the recent case of Maben v. Rankin.4 0
Defendant caused plaintiff to be taken to the psychiatric
ward of St. John's Hospital to be detained there while he
gave her electroshock treatments. Plaintiff's examination
had been at request of her husband. There was evidence
that plaintiff's husband had consented to her confinement
and treatment. However, she had not consented. Plain-
tiff claimed she was not mentally ill. She had expert
testimony to support her contention. Defendant testified
that, based upon his observations and the information
which he had received from plaintiff's husband and other
doctors, she was mentally ill and needed hospital care
and electroshock treatments.
Defendant had failed to complete and file the certificate
required by statute.
Plaintiff sued for false imprisonment and assault and
battery and recovered a judgment of $78,000. On appeal
the judgment was reversed and a new trial granted, al-
though the Court indicated judgment should be for plain-
tiff. The Court said:
"In this connection the jury was instructed that the
burden was on defendants to prove that the husband
consented in good faith on plaintiff's behalf and for
her benefit to the restraint and treatment. This placed
an excessive burden of proof on defendants with re-
spect to the husband's good faith. A doctor is not re-
quired to investigate whether the consenting husband
has an ulterior motive in the absence of circumstances
which put him on notice that the husband is acting
in bad faith. The burden of proving that the doctor
was put on notice is on the plaintiff. Good faith is
presumed.
"* * * The involuntary hospitalization of a person in a
mental institution in violation of the statute consti-
tutes false imprisonment. Insofar as force is used to
accomplish the unlawful detention, there is also lia-
bility for assault and battery. However, the use of
4055 Cal. 2d 139, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 P. 2d 681 (1961).
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force in the treatment of the patient so hospitalized
may not constitute assault and battery in all circum-
stances.
41
SUMMARY
By way of summary my advice to physicians is as fol-
lows:
(1) When one has an opportunity to obtain express
consent be sure the patient is competent to authorize the
necessary operative procedure.
(2) Explain to the patient in lay language the nature of
the operation, why it is necessary and the risks, if any,
which are involved.
(3) Obtain the consent of the patient, or someone
authorized to act on his behalf, in writing in the broad form
suggested above, and have the execution of the document
witnessed by someone cognizant of the background.
(4) If written authorization is not practicable, if possi-
ble, obtain the oral consent of the patient or someone
authorized to act on his behalf.
(5) Whether the consent is written or oral a summary
of the surrounding circumstances, duly witnessed, should
be noted on the patient's hospital chart or office history card.
This should include a concise statement of his physical and
mental condition at the time of such execution.
(6) In cases where the patient's express consent can-
not, for one reason or another, be obtained and someone
authorized to act on his behalf cannot be contacted, then
the guide is, "will the proposed operative procedure pre-
serve the patient's life, limb or health?" - not "will he be
better off with this operation?" In such an emergency a
physician has to rely on experience and judgment. Many
times it will have to be a calculated risk. On such occa-
sions I am sure that the Hippocratic oath will be of greater
help and have more significance than decisions of .any
court to which attention can be directed.
- Id., 682, 683-684.
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